By Bill Sweetman
Sunday, July 7 1996; Page C03

The Washington Post

    LATE IN May, on a bright afternoon in Dayton, Ohio, a group of engineers in their fifties and sixties posed happily for cameras in front of a strange blue airplane, with a bluff nose and tapering,
flipper-like tail that had earned it the nickname Whale. It could have been the public debut of any
new aircraft, with one exception: the plane had been completed 14 years earlier. The Whale, a
prototype radar plane officially known only as Tacit Blue, had made its first flight in 1982 and its last
flight in 1985 when somebody eliminated its mission. The Air Force won't tell you where it spent the
next 11 years because the Whale is a creature of the military's "black world," in which tens of
thousands of people work on projects in an environment of pervasive, rigorous secrecy. The massive
growth of a clandestine military was one of the most criticized features of the Reagan-Bush defense
build-up. Over 12 years, hundreds of billions of dollars were spent in secret on airplanes and
spacecraft, on test facilities and bases and on covert operations. With the end of the Cold War and a
new administration, some people predicted that the Pentagon might cut back and bring these
projects into the light.
They were wrong. Under the Clinton administration, clandestine projects are still expensive and still
secret. That part of the black military budget that can be glimpsed stands at more than $14 billion --
close to its 1980s peak. But this is mostly for research and development as well as some production.
It does not include undiscoverable billions spent for operations, support and construction projects.
Pushing this trend is a Pentagon led by a substantial number of civilian and military officials with
extensive black budget experience. Starting with Secretary of Defense William Perry, they believe
that the clandestine development of costly, high-tech weapons is the best way to provide the United
States with a battlefield advantage. Coming at a time when much other military spending is declining,
the effect is a shift in Pentagon priorities that has not been debated. For instance, under the Clinton
administration's budget request for next year, the Air Force-which has historically handled the bulk
of black programs-plans to spend two-thirds more on secret research and development than it did
under the last budget that George Bush sent to Congress, a $2.1 billion increase. Clinton wants to
spend another $5.9 billion of the Air Force budget on producing secret weapons, a small reduction
from the last Bush budget, but more than offset by the surge in research.
In 1997, almost 40 cents of every dollar that the USAF will spend on equipment will be spent on
secret projects. The secret Air Force spends 25 percent more on weapons development than the
entire United States Army.
The same trend is repeated, to a lesser degree, in the Navy. Despite generally lower budgets, the
Navy still spends a relatively steady $1.6 billion a year on secret research projects.
You won't find these numbers in a public document, but it is possible to estimate the cost because
some of the figures are only thinly concealed in the unclassified version of the Pentagon budget.
Three methods are used:
In the research and development budget, the line items listed for "operational systems development"
do not add up to the total for that section. The difference -- $4.8 billion in the Air Force budget-is
accounted for by classified programs.
Generic line items cover many programs. The best example is the "Selected Activities" line in the Air
Force procurement budget: At $4.67 billion, it is the largest line item in the entire budget. It is much
more than the Air Force will spend on buying airplanes. Some programs are listed but carry code
names. The Air Force uses a random Pentagonese name generator to produce "Advanced Program
Evaluation" or "Special Evaluation System" while the Navy hits the garden-center catalog for "Link
Laurel" and "Retract Maple."
Where all this money goes is a deepening mystery. In the 1980s and early 1990s, most secret
spending went for two items: stealth aircraft and satellites developed by the National Reconnaissance
Office (NRO). But the biggest stealth projects-such as the B-2 and F-117 -- have been brought into
the white world. At the same time, satellites last longer-something which may explain the drop in
secret production funds. It is hardly surprising that many people do not believe the CIA and the Air
Force when they deny the existence of large programs like the rumored 4,000-mph Aurora
spyplane. The key number is the surge in research and development-which often precedes much
larger spending when it comes time to build the weapons. Every morning in Las Vegas, between 700
and 1,000 people board anonymous 737 jetliners and fly to Area 51, the Nevada flight-test base
which has been the home of classified airplane projects since 1955. In 1992, McDonnell Douglas set
up the Phantom Works to pursue classified research and development projects. Its success is one of
the reasons why the company's Pentagon business has stayed high despite the winding down of
orders for its fighters. Lockheed Martin's renowned Skunk Works employs 4,000 people-even
though the only aircraft it is known to have built since 1990 are two small spy drones. The Air
Force's research campus at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, in Dayton, is bustling. Construction
continues on a new office complex-a strange sight in the midst of a defense drawdown. And these
are no ordinary offices: with nine-inch-thick internal doors, two basement levels with separate
staircases, and high-security video-conference facilities. There is no doubt that part of what the black
budget is paying for is aircraft that are as yet undisclosed. Area 51 was significantly expanded just
after the Whale-its most recent known resident-ended its flying career. Another enigma centers on
the secure air base at Tonopah, Nev., where the F-117 Stealth fighter became operational in 1983.
Just after the Gulf War, the Stealth fighters were evicted and moved to Holloman Air Force Base in
New Mexico. Yet Tonopah is still active.
Support for these ventures comes from the top. When Les Aspin, Clinton's first defense secretary,
conducted a "bottom-up" spending review in September 1993, he left secret programs unscathed.
When Aspin unexpectedly resigned after less than a year, Clinton turned to Aspin's deputy, William
Perry, a defense entrepreneur. Sometimes called "the godfather of Stealth," Perry had been
instrumental in the development of the first stealth airplanes-as a key member of President Carter's
Pentagon team in the late 1970s. During Perry's tenure, the upper Pentagon ranks have filled with
people who have similarly long backgrounds in classified programs. Paul Kaminski, the senior official
in charge of Pentagon research, was Perry's special assistant on the stealth programs. Air Force
Secretary Sheila Widnall is a former trustee of the Aerospace Corp. in Los Angeles, a low-profile
non-profit company which manages many of the Air Force's classified space projects. The Air
Force's senior official in charge of research and development, Arthur Money, came to the Pentagon
after 23 years at ESL, the electronic surveillance equipment company that Perry had founded.
In the uniformed services, Gen. Joseph Ralston, the new vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
was a member of the small Pentagon team which developed the F-117 concept in 1976-79. Arthur
Money's uniformed counterpart is Lt. Gen. George Muellner, former commander of the Air Force's
6513th Test Squadron-one of its classified flight-test units. The first operational stealth fighter unit,
the 4450th Tactical Group, existed for only six years and was smaller than a normal Air Force
wing-yet seven of its former group and squadron commanders are now generals.
The White House has been cooperative with the Pentagon's requests in expanding its secret world.
Take the case of Area 51, which the Air Force refuses to admit exists even though photographs of
the base have appeared in dozens of magazines. When the Air Force decided to seize two tracts of
public land that overlooked the base, the Department of the Interior was told to comply. When an
attorney filed a lawsuit on behalf of some Area 51 workers who claimed to have been injured by
toxic materials, President Clinton signed an
"exemption," telling a United States district court judge that the Air Force need not disclose any
documents relating to the base. The direct cost of this secrecy is substantial. Between 10 and 15
percent of the cost of a black program is absorbed by security measures: from the establishment of
separate financial and administrative systems for every project to the cost of flying people to work
every morning. When Tacit Blue was unveiled, one of the program managers told me that Pentagon
undercover agents were assigned to contact the spouses of people on the program, attempting to
find out if anyone had violated the law by answering the question "How was your day at work,
dear?"
Accountability is the real issue. Congressional national security and intelligence committees, in theory,
oversee black programs. Judging by the fact that the NRO has confessed to losing track of $4 billion
in surplus funds, this oversight seems less than effective. It does not cover the blackest of all black
projects-the "waived" programs, which are secret even from the committees. The black world
prospers and becomes ever more established while a compliant administration overrides the judiciary
at its request. The Pentagon's leaders are immersed in its culture. It briefs a few members of
Congress who are cleared into some-but not all of its programs, and who lack the data and the time
needed to map the secret labyrinth.
Most citizens accept the need for secrecy in times of crisis. And most would accept the need for the
country to pursue technical breakthroughs sheltered from prying eyes. But the question is whether a
secret military should be such a thriving, unaccountable institution when the security of the nation is
less threatened than it has been for decades.
Bill Sweetman, who specializes in aerospace and defense issues, writes for Popular Science and
Jane's International Defense Review. His most recent book is "Aurora-The Pentagon's Secret
Spyplane."
(c) Copyright 1996 The Washington Post Company